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Introduction
　The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPPA) was signed in 
Auckland, New Zealand on 4 February 2016. All twelve parties to 
the TPP are APEC member economies which four of them are also 
Member States of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN). Three more ASEAN members ─ Indonesia, Thailand and 
the Philippines have expressed their interest to join the TPP. Many 
have argued that the TPP is an initiative to counter balance the 
emergence of China in the world economy. The US President, Bar-
rack Obama, after the agreement was reached in Atlanta on 5 Octo-
ber 2015, said.1）
When more than 95 percent of our potential customers live 
outside our borders, we canʼt let countries like China write 
the rules of the global economy. We should write those 
＊　Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Malaya
1）　https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-of fice/2015/10/05/statement-
president-trans-pacific-partnership
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rules, opening new markets to American products while 
setting high standards for protecting workers and preserv-
ing our environment.
Promoted as a unique and modern “21st century agreement”, the 
TPPA has five defining features: (i) comprehensive market access, 
(ii) regional approach to commitments, (iii) addressing new trade 
challenges, (iv) inclusive trade and (v) platform for regional cooper-
ation.2） The TPP includes 30 chapters covering trade and trade-relat-
ed issues with the goal to “promote economic growth; support the 
creation and retention of jobs; enhance innovation, productivity and 
competitiveness; raise living standards; reduce poverty in our coun-
tries; and promote transparency, good governance and enhanced la-
bor and environmental protections.”3） Chapter 14 of the TPPA on 
electronic commerce contains some provisions concerning privacy 
and data protection, which is the focus of this paper. These provi-
sions, namely Articles 14.8, 14.11 and 14.13, are critically analyzed 
to assess their impact on privacy and data protection. It is also aimed 
at determining the obligations imposed by the agreement on the 
member countries should it be implemented.
Personal Data Protection: The Weakest Link?
Article 14.8.2 paragraph 2 of the TPPA states that:
2）　See the United States Trade Representative (USTR), “Summary of the Trans-
Pacific Partnership Agreement” available at https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-
of fices/press-of fice/press-releases/2015/october/summary-trans-pacific-
partnership, visited on 4 March 2016. The BBC regarded it as one of the most 
ambitious free trade agreements ever signed. See BBC News, “TPP: What is it 
and why does it matter?” available at www.bbc.com/news/business-32498715, vis-
ited on % March 2016.
3）　Ibid.
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Each Party shall adopt or maintain a legal framework that 
provides for the protection of the personal information of 
the users of electronic commerce. In the development of 
its legal framework for the protection of personal informa-
tion, each Party should take into account principles and 
guidelines of relevant international bodies.
　Unfortunately, this provision is subject to a footnote which diluted 
the impact of the provision. Footnote 6 states, “For greater certainty, 
a Party may comply with the obligation in this paragraph by adopt-
ing or maintaining measures such as a comprehensive privacy, per-
sonal information or personal data protection laws, sector ─ specific 
laws covering privacy, or laws that provide for the enforcement 
of voluntary undertakings by enterprises relating to privacy. 
This last clause seems to be written with the USAʼs Federal Trade 
Commission in mind4） recognizing the diversity of the legal ap-
proaches to privacy protection across the TPP economies from the 
sectoral approach of the United States to the omnibus laws in coun-
tries such Malaysia, Singapore, Australia, New Zealand, etc.
　Graham Greenleaf argues that “Given that a ʻlegal frameworkʼ is 
required, mere self-regulation would not appear to be sufficient.” 
However, he further argues that since a ʻmeasureʼ is defined to in-
clude ʻany...practice (Article 1.3), as well as laws, even this is not 
completely free from doubt.5）
　Debatably, the footnotes effectively means that the TPPʼs privacy 
4）　See Graham Greenleaf, “The TPP & Other Free Trade Agreements: Faustian 
Bargains for Privacy”, available at file:///C:/Users/user/Downloads/SSRN-
id2732386%20(1).pdf, visited on 4 March 2016.
5）　Ibid.
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requirements can be met without the need for a law at all.6） Enforc-
ing voluntary undertaking is not a privacy law, it is an anti-fraud ap-
proach that requires companies to be truthful about their privacy 
promises. If the law does not feature specific requirements for the 
consent, use, and disclosure of personal information, it is not a priva-
cy law.7） The TPP weakens global privacy protections by failing to 
establish a minimum privacy law standard and then makes matters 
worse by limiting the ability for member countries to establish some 
additional safeguards. Article 14.8.2 adopts an inert mechanism for 
privacy which does no more than require the presence of a legal 
framework for protecting privacy, seemingly allowing the U.Sʼs 
patchwork approach to persist.8）
　As provided for in Article 14.8.2, each State party is required to 
take into account principles and guidelines of relevant international 
bodies in developing its legal framework to protect personal data. 
Graham Greenleaf argues:9）
However, no specific international instruments are men-
tioned, and there is no list of principles included in the 
TPP. Nor are any specific enforcement measures men-
tioned. These absences make the ʻlegal frameworkʼ re-
quired by the Article completely nebulous. These content 
6）　Michael Geist, “The Trouble with the TPP, Day 11: Weak Privacy Standard”, 
available at http://www.michaelgeist.ca/2016/01/the-trouble-with-the-tpp-day-11-
weak-privacy-standards/, visited on 4 March 2016.
7）　Ibid.
8）　See the Canadian Internet Policy and Public Interest Clinic (CIPPIC), “The 
Highlights of the Trans-Pacific partnership E-Commerce Chapter”, available 
https://www.citizen.org/documents/tpp-ecommerce-chapter-analysis.pdf, visited 
on 4 March 2016.
9）　Supra n. 4.
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provisions are even weaker than the APEC Privacy Frame-
work, which is ridiculous given that TPP parties are also 
APEC member economies, and that the APEC Framework 
standards are very low.
　As mentioned above, since all twelve TPP members are APEC 
Member Economies, it is reasonable to assume that one of the 
sources for the principles and guidelines is the APEC Privacy 
Framework. However, the APEC Framework is widely recognized 
as providing weak protection for individual privacy.10） In reality, 
many APEC Member Economies have adopted domestic legislation 
which is stronger than the APEC Privacy Framework. Perhaps, only 
Brunei and Vietnam which have yet to have a data protection law 
can take the benefit of this provision.
　The further note to Article 14.8 provides that “Brunei Darussalam 
and Vietnam are not required to apply this article before the date on 
which that party implements its legal framework that provides for 
the protection of personal data of the users of electronic commerce”. 
The question that need to be asked is; what about the TPPʼs ten re-
maining member economies ─ do their existing legal frameworks 
meet the requirements of the article?
Cross - Border Data Transfer: Balancing Privacy and Trade
　It is recognized that the movement of information across national 
borders drives todayʼs global economy. Cross-border data transfers 
allow businesses and consumers access the best to the best avail-
able technology and services, wherever those resources may be lo-
cated around the world.11） The seamless transfer of information is as 
10）　Supra n. 8.
11）　See U.S Chamber of Commerce, “Business without Borders: The Importance 
of Cross-Border Data Transfers to Global Prosperity,” available at https://www.
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critically important as it is inexorably linked to the growth and suc-
cess of the global economy.12） On the other hand, personal informa-
tion of customers need to be protected. Striking the right balance 
between these two, however, is not easy.
　The increasing presence of free flow of information language 
within the e-commerce chapter of trade agreements should not be a 
surprise, as one can construct the idea of cross-border flow of valu-
able data as “trade,” but it still deserves careful consideration and 
construction, as this is not oil, or bananas, or sugarcane. This data is 
not abstract ─ it is about people. Referring to it in purely economic 
terms typically elides or avoids that inconvenient truth.13）
　According to the Consumers International, during the TPPA ne-
gotiations, there is no record of “free flow of information” discourse 
being used by the TPPA-member countries other than the US.14） 
The US has incorporated this discourse into the foreign policy of 
both the US Department of State and the US Trade Representative 
(USTR). The USTR has said, for example, that the US wants TPP 
partners “to agree to not to prevent the free flow of data across bor-
ders”. This is important in particular for e-commerce companies and 
cloud companies, which are both key drivers in US markets and 
huntonprivacyblog.com/files/2014/05/021384_BusinessWOBorders_final.pdf, 
visited on 5 March 2016.
12）　Ibid.
13）　See Consumers International, “Information Flow and Trade Agreements: His-
tory and Implications for Consumersʼ Privacy”, available at http://a2knetwork.
org/sites/default/files/tpp_and_free_flow.pdf, visited on 16 March 2016.
14）　Ibid.
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strong influencers of US policy.15）
　Although the US trade agreements have long included language 
related to e-commerce, the US and Republic of Korea were the first 
states to include principles related to Internet openness and Internet 
stability in the electronic commerce chapter of the Korea/US Free 
Trade Agreement (KORUS).16） The two countries agreed to encour-
age the free flow of information. Article 15.8 of the KORUS states; 
“Recognizing the importance of the free flow of information in facili-
tating trade and acknowledging the importance of protecting per-
sonal information, the Parties shall endeavor to refrain from impos-
ing or maintaining unnecessary barriers to electronic information 
flows across borders.”
　Since the terms used are “shall endeavor to”, arguably, that provi-
sion is not binding. This has raised protests from the US corpora-
tions, which look for stronger, legally binding language that would 
empower them to enforce free trade obligation against local privacy 
protection. Interestingly, what the US did not manage to get from a 
country, she managed to get in from a group of eleven countries. 
The TPPA employs stronger terms than the terms in the KORUS. 
Article 14.11.2 of the TPPA provides:
Each Party shall allow the cross-border transfer of informa-
tion by electronic means, including personal information, 
when this activity is for the conduct of the business of a 
15）　Ibid.
16）　See Elliot School of International Affairs (The George Washington University) 
and MacArthur Foundation, “Trade and the Internet: The Challenge of the NSA 
Revelations Policies in the US, EU, and Canada,” available at http://www.gwu.
edu/~iiep/assets/docs/papers/Aaronson_Maxim_Trade_Internet.pdf, visited 
on11 March 2016.
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covered person.
　More interestingly, the TPPA in the first paragraph of this Article 
recognizes that each Party may have its own regulatory require-
ments concerning the transfer of information by electronic means. 
Makes no mistake ─ this provision should not be interpreted as an 
exception that can override the substantive obligation in the subse-
quent provision of Article 14.11.2.
　The usage of the word “shall” obligates the TPP member econo-
mies to ensure the free flow of information including personal data 
across their borders. Remarkably, the draft of the TPPA is very 
much like the provision in the KORUS which simply says, “Parties 
shall refrain from imposing or maintaining unnecessary barriers to 
electronic information flows across borders.”
　Carl Schonander, the Director of International Public Policy at the 
Software & Information Industry Association (SIIA) states that arti-
cle 14.11 on “Cross-Border Transfer of Information by Electronic 
Means” is perhaps the core element in the new digital trade archi-
tecture forged by TPP. Article 14.11.2, according to him, “... gets to 
the heart of what the TPP negotiators have achieved” and it is 
groundbreaking in trade terms.17） Meanwhile, the Canadian Internet 
Policy and Public Interest Clinic (CIPPIC) asserts that this provision 
grants businesses the freedom to outsource data storage and pro-
cessing to any other TPP jurisdiction without limitation.18）
　During the negotiation process, the US encountered significant 
17）　See Carl Schonander, “Text Release Shows TPP Countries Get Cross Border 
Data Flows Right”, available at http://www.siia.net/blog/index/Post/62751/
Text-Release-Shows-TPP-Countries-Get-Cross-Border-Data-Flows-Right, visited 
on 5 March 2016.
18）　Supra n. 8
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opposition on this free flow provisions because of the different ap-
proaches adopted by the US and other countries in protecting priva-
cy and personal data.19） As mentioned earlier, the US wanted to en-
sure data can flow freely across borders with only narrow exceptions. 
However, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada have made protection 
of privacy rather than the flow of information a top priority for inter-
national rules governing cross border information flows.20） Australia 
attempted to table alternative language to ensure that this data flow 
provision would be consistent with its privacy law which has re-
ceived support from a number of countries. The US responded to 
the Australian demands by proposing a more ad hoc strategy, which 
adheres to the APEC Privacy Framework.21）
　As mentioned earlier, the TPPA in Article 14.8.2 requires each 
state Party to adopt a legal framework to protect privacy and person-
al information. The question is how this Article should be reconciled 
with Article 14.11.2. On the one hand, the TPPA requires the mem-
ber states to have a data protection legal framework, on the other, 
they should allow the cross-border transfer of data. Should Article 
14.11.2 be interpreted to mean that member states should allow 
cross-border of data to a country or territory regardless of whether 
the said country provides an adequate level of protection? Burcu Kil-
ic, a policy director with the Public citizenʼs information society pro-
gramme said:22）
19）　Supra n. 13.
20）　Ibid.
21）　Ibid.
22）　See Public Citizen Press Room, “TPP Text Reveals Risk for Consumer Privacy 
Reform,” available at https://www.citizen.org/pressroom/pressroomredirect.
cfm?ID=5723, visited on 11 March 2016.
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Through these provisions in the TPP, the United States ap-
pears to be moving to limit policy options for safeguarding 
privacy across borders, even while the European Union 
moves to expand them. The TPP could limit the ability of 
the United States and other countries to follow Europeʼs 
path, or to protect privacy by conducting the movement of 
data across borders in compliance with the host countryʼs 
privacy rules for personal information. The memory of 
misuse of data and National Security Agency surveillance 
is so fresh, and we should be careful about giving up con-
trol of our data.
　On the secondary issue, the TPPA does not define “for the con-
duct of the business.” This could leave the door open for a broad in-
terpretation that could encompass a wide variety of purposes. The fi-
nancial services industry is not covered by the cross-border data 
rules and Australia has been given an exemption for medical re-
cords. On the impact of this free flow of data provision on privacy 
protection, the Consumers International remarks:23）
Countries involved in the TPPA negotiations have signifi-
cant differences in the level of protection they provide to 
personal information. Applying the methodology used in a 
2005 U.S. government study to updated information on 
protection to consumersʼ privacy among TPPA countries, 
we find that: for consumers in countries with higher level 
of protection to privacy (such as Canada, New Zealand, 
Mexico, and Peru), the free flow of information may imply 
a significant risk of defeating their domestic privacy poli-
23）　Supra n. 13.
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cies by exporting data to countries with lower or no protec-
tion. Even for consumers in countries that provide some 
protection (such as the U.S. and South Korea), there is a 
risk of allowing exportation of their information to over-
seas facilities in countries with uncertain protections for 
their privacy.
　Oddly, on 12 January 2016, the US Representative Mike Kelly (R-
PA) ─ a member of the House Ways and Means Subcommittee on 
Trade together with other 63 Members of Congress sent a biparti-
san letter to the Obama Administration expressing their concern 
with the data flow and data localization provisions in the TPP which 
excludes the financial services companies. The letter states, “As in 
every sector, US financial services companies depend on the free 
flow of data to run operations on a global basis. ︙Omission of these 
disciplines in the TPP is a missed opportunity to ensure that all US 
companies benefits from strong rules prohibiting localization re-
quirements. We note that such disciplines can be included in trade 
agreements while maintaining the ability of US regulators to protect 
consumers through prudential regulations.”24）
Simply put, these US Congressmen are saying that what the US has 
gotten is not enough. The lawmakers argued that banking, insur-
ance and securities industries are not different from other sectors 
that depend on the unimpeded flow of data to keep their businesses 
running in vast global market place. They wrote, “We request that 
your agencies use available measures to address the existing gaps 
24）　The letter is available at http://kelly.house.gov/sites/kelly.house.gov/files/
documents/Kelly%20Paulsen%20Moulton%20Kuster%20Data%20Localization%20
Letter%20to%20USTR%20Treasury%20NEC%20SIGNED%201-11-2016.pdf, visited 
on 16 March 2016.
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in the TPP.”25）
Prohibition on Data Localization: The First of Many in the 
Future?
　The TPPA in Article 14.13.1, on the one hand, recognizes that 
each Party may have its own regulatory requirements regarding the 
use of computing facilities, including requirements that seek to en-
sure the security and confidentiality of communications. Article 
14.13.2 on the other hand, provides that no party shall require a cov-
ered person to use or locate computing facilities in that Partyʼs terri-
tory as a condition for conducting business in that territory. This 
provision is inter-related with the free flow of data discussed earlier. 
Data localization restricts data flow because companies would be 
forced to invest in additional data centers. The TPPA seeks to give 
the freedom to companies to choose where to store their data and 
they can transfer data collected in that Partyʼs borders to their serv-
ers at home or wherever.
　According to the US Trade Representative (USTR), this is the 
first US free trade agreement ever to include an explicit commit-
ment against forced localization of computing facilities. Many argue 
that the restriction on data localization originates from the Silicon 
Valley tech company frustration with a growing number of govern-
ments that want local data to remain within their jurisdiction.26） The 
USTR claims that localization requirements are trade protectionist 
strategies that disadvantage foreign goods, services, or IP compared 
to domestic goods, and has long considered any requirements to 
25）　Ibid.
26）　See e.g. Michael Geist, “How the TPP Puts Canadian Privacy at Risk,” available 
at http://www.michaelgeist.ca/2015/10/how-the-tpp-puts-canadian-privacy-at-
risk/, visited on 15 March 2016.
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use local network infrastructure or local servers as non-tariff barri-
ers that amount to discriminatory restrictions on trading rights.27） 
The US also feels that localization requirements would undermine 
the advantage currently enjoyed by US cloud-based services, since 
most, if not all, corporations that utilize cloud-based services are 
currently located in the US.28） By having this ban on data localiza-
tion, the US managed to get what she wanted from other TPP mem-
ber states.
　In reality, as Professor Michael Geist has said, “Data localization 
has emerged as an increasingly popular legal method for providing 
some additional assurances about the privacy protection for personal 
information. Although heavily criticized by those who fear that it 
harms the free flow of information, requirements that personal in-
formation be stored within the local jurisdiction is an unsurprising 
reaction to concerns about the lost privacy protections if the data is 
stored elsewhere.”29） Data localization requirements are popping up 
around the world with European requirements in countries such as 
Germany, Russia, and Greece; Asian requirements in Taiwan, re-
quirements in Brazil. Canada has not been immune to the rules ei-
ther with both British Columbia and Nova Scotia creating localiza-
tion requirements for government data.30）
　In contrast, the USTR states that, “The cloud should be global, 
27）　Supra n. 8.
28）　Ibid.
29）　Michael Geist, “The Trouble with the TPP, Day 12: Restricting on Data Local-
ization Requirements, available at http://www.michaelgeist.ca/2016/01/the-
trouble-with-the-tpp-day-12-restrictions-on-data-localization-requirements/, visited 
on 16 March 2016.
30）　Ibid.
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and you should be able to choose where you store your data. We 
have already seen a troubling trend of countries practicing “digital 
protectionism”, and trying to make keeping data onshore the cost of 
doing business. That is not just costly for small business, it will also 
have the effect of leaving countries behind. TPP prevents those 
kinds of arbitrary requirements.”31） Further, according to the USTR, 
TPP ensures that companies can locate servers where they choose 
based on cost, efficiency, and security, rather than being subject to 
forced localization rules that raise costs and reduce the efficiency of 
investment.32）
Exceptions to the Data Flow and Data Localization Require-
ments: An Illusion?
　There are a number of exceptions allowed by the TPPA. Under 
Article 14.2.3, the exceptions are: (i) government procurement, or 
(ii) information “held or processed by or on behalf of a Party, or 
measures related to such information, including measures related to 
its collection.” These could be significant exclusions and might, for 
instance, allow TPP governments to require that processing or stor-
age of government data occur on domestic computing facilities.
　The financial institutions are also excluded. The definition of “cov-
ered person” in Article 14.1 excludes “financial institution[s]” and 
any “cross-border financial service supplier of a Party” as defined in 
Chapter 11 (Financial Services). The financial institutions will be 
forced to rely on the commitments specifically applicable to financial 
service suppliers set forth in Chapter 11 and other chapters of the 
31）　See the USTRʼs Fact Sheet, “Trans-Pacific Partnership”, available at https://
ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-Promoting-Digital-Trade-Fact-Sheet.pdf, visited 
on 16 March 2016.
32）　Ibid.
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TPP. As mentioned earlier, this has led some lawmakers in the US 
expressed their concern and sent a letter to the Obama Administra-
tion.
　Another exception is in relation to the national security as provid-
ed for in Article 29.2(a). It states that nothing in the TPP, including 
Chapter 14, precludes a Party from applying measures that “it con-
siders necessary for the fulfillment of its obligations with respect to 
the maintenance or restoration of international peace or security, or 
the protection of its own essential security interests.” Historically, 
security exceptions based on similar text often have been consid-
ered to be largely self-justifying, under the view that they can be in-
voked by a Party whenever “it considers” the exception to apply. 
This could make it difficult for Parties to challenge measures that 
facially violate one or more Chapter 14 commitments, but which a 
Party justifies as necessary to protect national security.33）
　The TPPA also incorporated the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS) exception into Chapter 14. This is specifically pro-
vided for in Article 29.1.3 which states that paragraphs (a), (b), and 
(c) of Article XIV (General Exceptions) are incorporated into and 
made part of this Agreement, mutatis mutandis. These GATS para-
graphs permit measures necessary to protect public morals or main-
tain public order; protect human, animal, or plant life or health; or to 
secure compliance with laws or regulations that are not inconsistent 
with the GATS. The exceptions are provided for in Articles 14.11.3 
and 14.13.3 which are similar, words for words. Article 14.11.3, con-
cerning free flow of data states:
33）　See Marty Hansen and Gabriel Slater, “The TPPʼs Electronic Commerce Chap-
ter,” Covington Global Policy Watch, available at https://www.globalpolicywatch.
com/2015/11/the-tpps-electronic-commerce-chapter/, visited on 23 March 2016.
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Nothing in this Article shall prevent a Party from adopting 
or maintaining measures inconsistent with paragraph 2 to 
achieve a legitimate public policy objective, provided that 
the measure:
(a) is not applied in a manner which would consti-
tute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimi-
nation or a disguised restriction on trade; and
(b) does not impose restrictions on the transfers 
of information greater than are required to 
achieve the objective.
　As for the data localization exception, the words “transfers of in-
formation” in (b) are replaced by “on the use or location of comput-
ing facilities.” The TPPA defines “measure” to include any law, regu-
lation, procedure, requirement or practice. Comparatively, the GATS 
adopted a very specific but broad definition in its Article XXVIII (a) 
which provides that “measures” means any measure by a Member, 
whether in the form of a law, regulation, rule, procedure, decision, 
administrative action, or any other form.
　The exceptions mean that in certain circumstances the member 
states may deviate from their obligation to ensure the free flow of 
data. A State party may also impose data localization provided the 
conditions can be satisfied. The USTR notes that the General Excep-
tions of chapter 14 ensures that the United States and the other TPP 
Parties are guaranteed the full right to regulate in the public inter-
est, including for national security and other policy reasons.
　The measure adopted by the country, however, must be undertak-
en: (i) to achieve a legitimate public policy objective, (ii) it is not ap-
plied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or un-
justifiable discrimination, (iii) it is not applied so as to be a disguised 
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restriction on trade, (iv) it does not impose restrictions on transfers 
of information greater than are required to achieve the objective or 
it does not impose restrictions on the use or location of computing 
facilities greater than are required to achieve the objective. There is 
a need to be emphasized here that it is not just public policy objec-
tive but “legitimate public policy objective.” The Party would have to 
justify the public policy objective is legitimate if it is challenged in 
dispute. Besides, the Party must also justify the other conditions 
mentioned above.
　The CIPPIC states that this exception appears to be difficult to 
use and insufficient to protect the policies, laws and regulations that 
Parties have or may have in the future to safeguard privacy.34） The 
language has many layers of qualifications, which are similar to the 
general exceptions adopted in Article XIV of the GATS35）. However, 
34）　Supra n. 8.
35）　Article XIV of the GATS ─ “Subject to the requirement that such measures are 
not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifi-
able discrimination between countries where like conditions prevail, or a dis-
guised restriction on trade in services, nothing in this Agreement shall be con-
strued to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any Member of measures:
　a) necessary to protect public morals or to maintain public order,
　b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; c) necessary to se-
cure compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent with the pro-
visions of this Agreement including those relating to:
　i) the prevention of deceptive and fraudulent practices or to deal with the effects 
of a default on services contracts;
　ii) the protection of the privacy of individuals in relation to the processing and dis-
semination of personal data and the protection of confidentiality of individual re-
cords and accounts; iii) safety;
　d) inconsistent with Article XVII, provided that the difference in treatment is 
aimed at ensuring the equitable or effective6 imposition or collection of direct 
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according to the CIPPIC, there is a key different: while the GATS 
provision allowing exceptions in the absence of discrimination or 
trade restrictions are included in the chapeau, the TPPA encodes 
the exception independently, placing the burden of showing that the 
measure meets all of its requirements on the government taking the 
measure.36）
　According to the Public Citizen, “The exceptions language for the 
TPP is based on the same construct used in Article XX of the World 
Trade Organizationʼs (WTO) General Agreement on Tarif fs and 
Trade (GATT) and Article XIV of the GATS. This is alarming, as the 
GATT and GATS exceptions have only ever been successfully em-
ployed to actually defend a challenged measure in one of 44 at-
tempts. That is, the exceptions would, in fact, not provide effective 
safeguards for domestic policies.37） In other words, the exceptions 
are illusory since the requirements are so complex (each aspect 
must be met) that countries relying on the exception have failed in 
43 out of 44 cases.38）
taxes in respect of services or service suppliers of other Members;
　e) inconsistent with Article II, provided that the difference in treatment is the re-
sult of an agreement on the avoidance of double taxation or provisions on the 
avoidance of double taxation in any other international agreement or arrange-
ment by which the Member is bound.
36）　Supra n. 8
37）　See Public Citizen, ”Only One of 44 Attempts to Use the GATT Article XX/
GATS Article XIV “General Exception” Has Ever Succeeded: Replicating the 
WTO Exception Construct Will Not Provide for an Effective TPP General Excep-
tion”, available at https://www.citizen.org/documents/general-exception.pdf, vis-
ited on 22 March 2016.
38）　Ibid.
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Concluding Remarks
　As the British Broadcasting Corporation puts it, “The TPP is one 
of the most ambitious free trade agreements ever signed.”39） It may 
not be an agreement for the 21st century but rather an expanded 
and improved 12 ─ country version of the Free Trade Agreements 
(FTAs) recently concluded by the US (in particular with Australia, 
South Korea, and Singapore.40） Of course, those bilateral FTAs are 
quite ambitious in their own right, and there are some areas in 
which the TPP exceeds them in the level of ambition. However, the 
TPP is no different from the existing FTAs in its basic framework 
for rules.41）
　Jeffrey D. Sachs, a world-renowned professor of economics, lead-
er in sustainable development, senior UN advisor, described by the 
New York Times as, “probably the most important economist in the 
world,” and by Time Magazine as “the worldʼs best known econo-
mist” has stated:42）
Globalization is a positive and powerful force for good, if it 
is embedded in the right kind of ethical and legal frame-
work. Yet the current draft of the Trans - Pacific Partner-
39）　See British Broadcasting Corporation, “TPP: What is it and why does it matter?, 
available at http://www.bbc.com/news/business-32498715, visited on 22 March 
2016.
40）　Tsuyoshi Kawase, “The TPP as a set of International Economic Rules”, avail-
able at http://www.voxeu.org/article/tpp-set-international-economic-rules, visit-
ed on 26 March 2016.
41）　Ibid.
42）　Jeffery D. Sachs, “TPP is too Flawed for a Simple ʻyesʼ Vote,” available at 
https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2015/11/08/jeffrey-sachs-tpp-too-flawed-
for-simple-yes-vote/sZd0nlnCr18RurX1n549GI/story.html, visited on 24 March 
2016.
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ship is not worthy of a simple thumbs-up by the Congress. 
Without jettisoning the purported goals of TPP, the 12 sig-
natories should slow down, take the pieces of this complex 
trade agreement in turn, and work harder for a set of inter-
national standards that will truly support global sustainable 
development.
　From the human rights perspective, the UNʼs independent expert 
on the promotion of democratic and equitable international order, 
Alfred de Zayas, argues that the TPP “is fundamentally flawed and 
should not be signed or ratified unless provision is made to guaran-
tee the regulatory space of States.”43） He further states that trade is 
not an end in itself, but must be seen in the context of the interna-
tional human rights regime, which imposes binding legal obligations 
on States. Trade agreements are not ʻstand-aloneʼ legal regimes, but 
must conform to the fundamental principles of international law, in-
cluding transparency and accountability.44） They must not delay, cir-
cumvent, undermine or make impossible the fulfilment of human 
rights treaty obligations. Interestingly, Alfred de Zayas suggested 
that the TPP can legally be contested:45）
Should the TPP ever enter into force, its compatibility with 
the international law should be challenged before the In-
ternational Court of Justice (ICJ). Already now, the ICJ 
43）　See The United Nations Human Rights (Office of the High Commissioner), 
Statement by the Independent Expert on the promotion of a democratic and equi-
table international order, Alfred de Zayas, on the upcoming signing the Trans-Pa-
cific Partnership, available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/
DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=17005&LangID=E, visited on 24 March 2016.
44）　Ibid.
45）　Ibid.
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could be called upon to issue an advisory opinion stating 
that in case of conflict between trade agreements and the 
UN Charter, including its provisions on State sovereignty, 
human rights and development, it is the Charter that pre-
vails.
　Chapter 14 of the TPPA seeks to achieve multiple objectives. The 
USTR provides the following rationales and objectives - “TPP will 
help preserve the open Internet and prevent its breakup into multi-
ple, balkanized networks in which data flows are more expensive 
and more frequently blocked. The Electronic Commerce chapter, 
according to the USTR, will ensure the free flow of data (subject to 
public-interest regulation, for example to prevent spam, protect pri-
vacy, and fight cyber-crime); prevent the spread of ʻforced localiza-
tionʼ of technologies and servers; and help to more effectively guar-
antee the security and privacy of internet users. All this will help to 
unlock the promise of digital trade through rules that keep the In-
ternet free and open, set digital trade rules-of-the-road, and provide 
the incentives and a stable framework that can nurture a healthy en-
vironment for companies and individuals as they create and use con-
tent.”46）
　Remarkably, in the negotiations between the US and the EU on 
the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), the EU 
trade negotiators have been telling their US counterparts to keep 
data protection out of trade talks. The EU negotiators said that they 
have no mandate to negotiate over data protection rules. In fact, data 
46）　See USTR, available at https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-Chapter-
Summary-Electronic-Commerce.pdf, visited on 17 March 2016.
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protection issue is one of the stumbling block for the negotiation to 
proceed further. The EU Justice Commissioner, Viviane Reding dur-
ing a speech in Washington in October 2013, said:47）
There are issues that will easily derail TTIP. One such is-
sue is data and the protection of personal data. This is an 
important issue in Europe because data protection is a fun-
damental right…This is why I am against bringing data 
protection to the trade talks. Data protection is not red tape 
or a tariff. It is a fundamental right and as such it is not ne-
gotiable.
　According to Timothy B. Lee, like most parts of the TPP, the new 
rules on electronic commerce largely reflect the priorities of compa-
nies. He argues further that like other recent trade deals, the TPP is 
a vehicle for helping powerful US interests write the rules of the 
global economy. With US technology firms becoming increasingly 
powerful in Washington and increasingly influential at the Office of 
the US Trade Representative, which negotiates trade deals ─ itʼs not 
surprising that the TPP included many provision favored by US 
technology companies. 48）
47）　See Ralf Bendrath, “TTIP and TiSA: Big Pressure to Trade Away Privacy,” 
available at http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-257-ttip-ralf-bendrath.pdf, 
visited on 15 March 2016.
48）　See Timothy B. Lee, “How the TPP Could Impact Regulation of Everything 
from Cars to Medical Devices”, available at http://www.vox.com/2015/11/29/
9760918/tpp-ecommerce-chapter, visited on 28 March 2016.
